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debts are issued with different contractual forms. In this paper we construct a new measure of the stock
of external sovereign debt for 100 developing countries from 1979 to 2006 that is invariant to contractual
form, and illustrate five problems with debt stocks measured at face value. First, we show that correcting
for differences in the contractual form of debt paints a very different quantitative, and in some cases
also qualitative, picture of the stock of developing country external sovereign debt. Second, rankings
of indebtedness across countries, which were historically used to define eligibility for debt forgiveness,
are sometimes inverted once we correct for differences in contractual form. Third, the empirical performance
of the benchmark quantitative model of sovereign debt deteriorates by between 40 to 70 percent once
model-consistent measures of debt are used. Fourth, we show how the spread of aggregation clauses
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introduce inefficiencies into the process of restructuring sovereign debts. Fifth, we show how the use
of contractual face values gives issuing countries the ability to manipulate their debt stock data, and
illustrate the use of these techniques in practice.
Daniel A. Dias
University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign 
  and CEMAPRE
109 David Kinley Hall









Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
230 South LaSalle St.
Chicago, IL 60604
and University of California, Los Angeles
and also NBER
mlwright@econ.ucla.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
With few exceptions, data on the stock of sovereign debt are presented at face value.
Deﬁned as the undiscounted sum of future principal repayments, face values can be a mis-
leading indicator of sovereign indebtedness because two debt contracts that possess identical
future cash ﬂows, but divide those cashﬂows into principal and interest in diﬀerent ways, will
have diﬀerent face values.
The emphasis on face values by statisticians and market participants creates at least
ﬁve important practical problems. First, the comparison of debt stocks at face value over
time and across countries is misleading in the light of signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the contractual
structure of debt portfolios across countries and over time. For example, low income countries
often borrow from oﬃcial sources at low interest rates while middle income countries borrow
at market interest rates, while international debt markets have shifted away from bank loans
issued at par towards bonds which are often issued at a discount. Second, as a consequence,
analyses of debt sustainability based on face values will be misleading, with some relatively
highly indebted countries being ineligible for debt relief. Third, it inhibits the assessment
of the empirical relevance of quantitative macroeconomic literature sovereign debt which
typically assumes that all sovereign debt takes the form of zero-coupon bonds. Fourth, it
may introduce ineﬃciencies into the process of restructuring sovereign debts where creditor
voting power is allocated on the basis of face values. Fifth, the emphasis on face values gives
the issuing country the ability, and sometimes an incentive, to manipulate their debt stock
data. For example, countries can understate the value of their debt stocks by issuing par
bonds (with a high interest rate and low principal) instead of the equivalent discount bonds
(with a lower interest rate and higher principal).
In this paper, we construct a new database of external sovereign debt stocks that
sheds light on the extent of these problems. Motivated by the extensive focus on zero-coupon
bonds in the theoretical literature on sovereign debt, we propose a new measure — the zero-
coupon-equivalent face value — of a country’s external sovereign debt, that is invariant to the
division of the cash ﬂows of a debt contract into principal and interest. We then construct
estimates of our measure of developing country indebtedness using unpublished data on the
cash ﬂows associated with a countries portfolio of external sovereign debts from the WorldBank’s Debtor Reporting System for a sample of 100 developing countries for the period 1979
to 2006.
Our ﬁndings bring both good news and bad news for users of data on the stock of
external sovereign debts. The good news is that much of our qualitative understanding of the
market for external sovereign debt is preserved when examined in the light of these new data.
The bad news is that much of our quantitative understanding of international debt markets
needs to be revised. Most dramatically, our new measures of the stock of external sovereign
debt reveal that the upper-middle income countries, and the countries of Latin America and
the Caribbean in particular, are relatively more indebted than other developing countries. In
some cases, the revised measure leads to dramatic changes in the measured relative level of
indebtedness, as in the case of Mexico where the debt stock measure more than doubles in
some years.
Some of our worst news is reserved for the quantitative theoretical literature on sov-
ereign debt and default. It is by now well-known that the benchmark Eaton and Gersovitz
(1981) model of sovereign debt and default, as explored quantitatively by Arellano (2008),
Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) and many others, produces levels of the face value of external
s o v e r e i g nd e b tt h a ta r eb e t w e e nﬁve and ten times smaller than the levels reported in tradi-
tional sovereign debt statistics. This empirical failure is all the more striking when it is noted
that these theoretical models restrict attention to zero-coupon bonds in which all future debt
service payments are regarded as principal, thus producing a maximal value for the model
generated face value of sovereign debt. We show that when data on the stock of external
sovereign debt is constructed using our theoretically consistent zero-coupon equivalent face
v a l u em e a s u r e ,i ti sa l m o s to n e - a n d - o n e - h a l ft i m e sa sl a r g ea st r a d i t i o n a le s t i m a t e s ,i m p l y i n g
that the benchmark model produces levels of the stock of sovereign debt between 7.5 and 15
times smaller than those observed in practice.
We also point to a potential problem associated with the more widespread adoption of
aggregation clauses in sovereign debt instruments, as envisaged by the Eurogroup (2010). As
voting rights in the event of a sovereign debt restructuring are proportional to the contrac-
tual face value of a bond, creditors whose debts include a high interest rate will have fewer
voting rights than creditors holding instruments with identical cashﬂows but lower interest
2rates. We show using our data that this would have the largest impact on private sector cred-
itors, indicating that more widespread use of aggregation clauses would lead to the relative
subordination of private sector claims. This may explain the reluctance of bondholders to
participate in bond issues including aggregation clauses and, in the event that such clauses
become widespread, may give private sector creditors an incentive to adopt contractual forms
— like zero-coupon bonds — that would maximize their voting power in the event of a future
sovereign debt restructuring. Finally, we also use our data to document at least one prima
facie case of a country varying the contractual form of its debt issuance in order to presents
its external debt position in a more favorable light.
It is important to stress a number of limitations of our analysis. We have nothing to say
about other limitations associated with the use of face values as a measure of indebtedness.
This includes, but is not limited to, concerns about the fact that face values are undiscounted
sums of future cash ﬂows and thus treat debts with diﬀerent maturity structures as equivalent.
This is closely related to concerns that face values are not accurate measures of the value of
a debt to investors, nor of the cost of servicing the debt to the sovereign country itself. All
of these issues may be summarized as concerns about the rate in which the cash ﬂows of a
debt occurring at diﬀerent dates should be discounted in forming a measure of indebtedness.
Any attempt to construct discounted values of debt stocks must confront the fact that the
absence of liquid markets for all but a small number of sovereign debts means it is not possible
to extract discount rates from market data. Moreover, it is not always appropriate to use
market discount rates in constructing measures of the cost of servicing a debt to the issuing
country. We discuss these issues, as well as alternative approaches for estimating appropriate
discount rates, in a companion paper (Dias, Richmond, and Wright 2011).
Data limitations mean that we focus entirely on external sovereign debts, despite the
recent surge in interest in the domestic debts of developing countries (for example, Reinhart
and Rogoﬀ 2008). Nonetheless, it is important to stress that the exact same measurement
problem applies to existing estimates of the stock of domestic sovereign debt. Our study of the
contractual structure of developing country sovereign debt and the way it leads to misleading
estimates of indebtedness complements Hall and Sargent’s (1997) analysis of the mismea-
surement of interest payments by the US Treasury. Our focus on contractual structure of
3sovereign debt per se l e a d su st of o c u so nad i ﬀerent set of summary measures of indebtedness
than does Hall and Sargent’s emphasis on the US government’s cost of borrowing.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple frame-
work that is useful in accounting for sovereign debts and illustrates, using a series of simple
examples, the measurement problems associated with using contractual face values when ag-
gregating debts with diﬀerent contractual structures. Section 3 describes our data sources.
Section 4 presents our quantitative and qualitative ﬁndings for the stock of developing coun-
try external sovereign debt and show by example how changing levels of relative indebtedness
could have aﬀected past eligibility for debt relief. Section 5 focuses on the policy implications
of these data, emphasizing the incentive of countries to manipulate their debt stock data, and
the incentives for creditors to vary the contractual form of their sovereign debts in anticipa-
tion of the more widespread use of aggregation clauses in sovereign debt instruments. Section
6 contains some concluding remarks, while a series of appendices describe our methods, data
sources, and ﬁndings in a greater level of detail than that presented in the paper.
2 Conceptual Framework
In this section, we introduce some notation that is helpful for talking about country
debt portfolios. We also deﬁne some measures that we will construct later in the paper and
present a series of simple examples to illustrate diﬀerent debt stock measures, their varying
strengths and weaknesses, and their potential quantitative importance.
2.A Notation
Consider a country that has a portfolio of debt contracts. Each debt contract speciﬁes
as t r e a mo fc a s hﬂows denominated in diﬀerent currencies falling due at future dates. We
denote by 
 () the cash ﬂow associated with contract  =1  of country  =1 
d u ea tt i m e =0 1∞ denominated in currency  =1  We allow for cashﬂows to be
deﬁned at  = ∞ to capture the case of perpetuities for which the principal is never repaid.
Although not a perfect description of the set of all outstanding sovereign debt contracts1,w e
restrict attention to contracts that pay, as long as there is no default, a non-state contingent
1On state contingent sovereign debt, see, for example (Grossman and Huyck 1988, Kletzer 2005, and
Alfaro and Kanczuk 2005).
4claim in a pre-speciﬁed set of currencies at a series of pre-speciﬁed dates.
The cash ﬂows associated with a debt contract are typically divided into principal
repayments, or amortization 
 () and interest payments (or coupons) 
 (). We will say
that two debt contracts 0 are equivalent if they specify the same cashﬂows 
 ()=0
0 ()
for all time periods  and currencies  for any countries  and 0 even if they divide these
cashﬂows into amortization and interest in diﬀerent ways; two equivalent debt contracts that
divide cashﬂows in diﬀerent ways will be described as having diﬀerent contractual forms.
Most countries owe debts denominated in a variety of diﬀerent currencies. In addi-
tion, some debt contracts are issued in multiple tranches, some of which are denominated in
diﬀerent currencies. If  () is the number of units of the numeraire currency, the US dollar,
that can be purchased with one unit of currency  then the dollar cashﬂows of contract 









Likewise, the cashﬂows of country 0 entire portfolio of debts are denoted by dropping the













These dollar cashﬂows are divided into dollar amortization and coupon payments analogously.
2.B Measuring Indebtedness
Almost all of the available data on the stock of outstanding sovereign debt, both domes-
tic and external, is presented at face value.2 T h ef a c ev a l u e , in US Dollars, of debt contract
2The face value of a debt is also sometimes referred to as the nominal value of a debt. For example, the
European statistical agency Eurostat states that “the nominal value is considered equivalent to the face value
of liabilities” (Eurostat 2010 p.305). To avoid confusion with measures of the debt stock that are, or are not,
adjusted for inﬂation, we do not use the term “nominal value” below.











In what follows, to distinguish this concept from the measures we introduce below, we will
r e f e rt ot h i sa st h econtractual face value of a debt contract, denoted  to capture the
notion that it is calculated using the assignment of cashﬂows to principal as written in the
original debt contract.
As is well known, there are a number of reasons why contractual face values can be a
misleading measure of total indebtedness. Perhaps the most obvious is that two equivalent
debt contracts can have diﬀerent contractual face values if they label these cashﬂows as
amortization and interest in diﬀerent ways.
Example 1 (Discount vs Par Bonds). Consider two one-period debt contracts both denom-
inated in the same currency issued at time zero and coming due at time one. The ﬁrst is a
par bond (issued at its contractual face value) with a positive coupon, while the second is a
zero-coupon bond issued at a discount. In the notation introduced above, suppressing currency
subscripts and country superscripts, the stream of payments associated with ﬁr s td e b tc a nb e
represented as 1 (1)  0 and 1 (1)  0 while the second has 2 (1)  0 and 2 (1) = 0
We assume that the two bonds are equivalent or that 1 (1) + 1 (1) = 2 (1) and so they
are valued identically by both the country itself and investors. Despite being equivalent, the
par bond has a contractual face value of  (0) = 1 (1) w h i c hi sl e s st h a nt h ec o n t r a c t u a l
face value of the zero coupon bond  (0) = 2 (1).
This potential problem with the use of contractual face values to measure relative
indebtedness across countries and over time would be of little concern if the structure of debt
contracts (and hence the split of cashﬂows into amortization and interest) was roughly con-
stant across countries and over time. This is far from the case in practice. As one example,
low income countries have access to loans at concessional interest rates from creditor country
governments and international institutions that result in a greater share of cashﬂows being
6recorded as amortization compared to interest payments than in middle income countries.3
As a result, the relative indebtedness of low income countries may be overstated. As an-
other example, there has been a dramatic shift amongst middle income countries over the
past quarter century away from bank loans, typically issued at par with a positive coupon,
towards bonds which are often issued at a discount. The use of contractual face values is
also problematic when interest rates vary over time. As interest rates rise, the cash ﬂows
associated with a par-bond of a given contractual face value will rise relative to those for
ad i s c o u n tb o n dw i t ht h es a m ec o n t r a c t u a lf a c e value. Hence, the relative importance of
various lending instruments will vary mechanically with changing interest rates.
To measure indebtedness in a way that is invariant to contractual form, it is necessary
to treat all cash ﬂows as though they are divided into amortization and coupon in the same
proportions. Although this can be done in an inﬁnite number of ways, we focus on a measure
that treats all cashﬂo w sa sp r i n c i p a l ,o ri no t h e rw o r d st r e a t sa l ld e b tc o n t r a c t sa st h o u g h
they are zero coupon bonds.4 Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne the zero-coupon equivalent face value of



















Note that we do not include cash ﬂows that are never paid (paid at inﬁnity) in this deﬁnition.5
The diﬀerence between the contractual face value of a debt and its zero-coupon equiv-
3The problematic treatment of concessional lending was behind the World Bank’s move to focus on net
present values of debt service in deﬁning eligibility for debt relief (see Claessens et al., 1996 and Easterly,
2001).
4Another alternative would be to treat all bonds as though they are par bonds. In 1997, the European
statistical agency introduced new accounting rules for imputing interest payments on a subset of all sovereign
bonds outstanding that amounts to measuring the principal of some discount bonds as though they were
par bonds (Eurostat 1997a,b). Under the new procedures, for both deep-discounted bonds (deﬁned as bonds
whose contractual coupon is less than 50% of the corresponding yield to maturity) and zero coupon bonds, the
diﬀerence between the issue price and the face value is treated as an interest payment due at redemption. Note
that discount bonds that do not meet the deep-discount criterion are not treated equivalently. The absence
of data on issue prices, and our aim of constructing a measure that allows for cross-country comparisons of
contractual structure, motivates our preference for the ZCE face value measure.
5Undiscounted measures of debt stocks like the ZCE face value return an inﬁnite value for simple per-
petuities such as United Kingdom consols. We do not view this as a weakness of our measure, as simple
perpetuities are typically grouped with common stock for many purposes (for example, the Bank for Inter-
national Settlements treats bank issued perpetuities as Tier 1 capital). In practice, the only sovereign issued
perpetuities of which we are aware are consols, and the United Kingdom is not a member of our dataset.
7alent (ZCE) value can be very large as the following theoretical examples drawn from the
quantitative literature on sovereign debt demonstrate.
Example 2 (Hatchondo-Martinez/Arellano-Ramanarayanan). In order to keep track of a
portfolio of bonds longer than one period maturity in a computationally tractable way, Hatch-
ondo and Martinez (2009) and Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2009) examine debt contracts
that take the form of a perpetuity with a coupon that decays exponentially at rate  Such debt
contracts are ‘memory-less’ so that debt issued at diﬀerent dates can be linearly aggregated.
With these contracts, a debt with contractual face value of one issued at time  pays a one unit
coupon at time +1 or ( +1 )=1  and a (1 − )
−+1 coupon, or ()=( 1− )
−+1  at
all dates +1  In our notation, the contractual face value of a portfolio of  such bonds
is given by 












Hence, the ratio of ZCE to contractual face values is given by 1 w h i c hi sr o u g h l ya2 0f o l d
diﬀerence for  ≈ 005 as commonly used in the quantitative sovereign debt literature.
Example 3 (Chatterjee-Eyigungor). Motivated by similar tractability concerns, Chatterjee
and Eyigungor (2009) examine a class of perpetuities that pay a constant coupon ()= for
all  and mature at rate  each period. A portfolio of  such bonds issued at time  is asso-
ciated with coupon payments of  (1 − )
−  and amortization payments of (1 − )
−(+1) 
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( +  (1 − ))
For the values used by Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2009)  =0 03 and  =0 05 the ratio of
ZCE to contractual face values for these bonds is 157
8ZCE face values are particularly convenient for comparing levels of indebtedness in the
data with levels produced by models from the recent quantitative literature on sovereign debt
cited above that focus exclusively on zero coupon bonds. They are also useful in calculating
the market price of defaultable debts when recovery rates are positive (see Benjamin and
Wright, 2009). Finally, they are very simple to calculate.
However, this measure also disguises a number of important features of a country’s
stock of sovereign debt, the most notable of which is that it disguises diﬀerences in the proﬁle
of payments over time. As discussed in our companion paper Dias, Richmond, and Wright
(2011), there are a number of practical problems associated with the construction of an
appropriate measure of discounted cashﬂows. These include, but are not limited to, the fact
that: the appropriate discount rate will vary according to the purpose for which the data will
be used; appropriate discount factors will vary over time, across countries and possibly also
over contracts; and, the absence of market prices for all but a small subset of sovereign debts.
These diﬃculties are reﬂected in the fact that most studies of discounted debt service ﬂows
use an arbitrary rate that is constant over time and across countries (for example, Easterly
2001 uses the average LIBOR rate while Dikhanov 1986 uses a ﬁxed 10 percent rate).
3D a t a S o u r c e s
The primary source for statistics on external sovereign debt are derived from the
World Bank’s Debtor Reporting System (DRS) and are compiled in its Global Development
Finance (GDF) publication.6 The DRS has been in existence since 1951 and records detailed
information at the level of an individual loan for external borrowing. All countries that
r e c e i v eaW o r l dB a n kl o a nc o n s e n ti nt h el o a no r credit agreement to provide information
on their external debt. The details of the reporting procedures are described in World Bank
(2000).
One of the purposes of the DRS database is to generate projections of future debt
service obligations of a country under various assumptions. Towards this end, the DRS
6Statistics on external debt are also available from the Joint External Debt Hub (JEDH), which is jointly
maintained by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the World Bank (WB), and combines
data from the DRS with data from creditor and market sources.
9records the years-to-maturity, interest rate, currency of denomination, and grace period of
each debt contract at each point in time. Such detailed data are only collected for long
term debts (debts with a maturity at issue in excess of one year), therefore all the results
below correspond to long term debt. Based on these data, and combined with forecasts for
the paths of future interest rates (for ﬂoating rate debt) and exchange rates, it can be used
to generate projections of debt service denominated in US dollars. We restrict attention to
sovereign debts that are either owed by the public sector of the country, or are owed by
private sector borrowers but are guaranteed by the public sector of the country (public and
publicly guaranteed).
Data on individual loans is conﬁdential and direct access to the DRS is restricted.
The data reported below is derived from an unpublished dataset constructed by World Bank
staﬀ at our request. The World Bank ensured the conﬁdentiality of the loan level data by
aggregating data across multiple loans. To preserve comparability with existing publicly
available World Bank external debt statistics, we use the same interest rate and exchange
rate assumptions that were used in compiling the GDF.
Our data on cashﬂows begin in 1980 and end in 2007, and for each year we generate
projected cashﬂows over a forty year time horinzon. To preserve comparability with GDF
data, we denote the sum of cashﬂows from year  o n w a r d sa st h es t o c ko fd e b ta so ft h eend
of year  − 1
4R e s u l t s
In this section, we examine the evolution of debt and debt payment terms using our
zero coupon equivalent face value measure, and compare it to results using the standard
contractual face value measure. We begin by examining the behavior of indebtedness at
an aggregate level for all countries, emphasizing the way in which this new measure alters
our understanding of the empirical performance of the benchmark model of sovereign debt
and default. We also discuss the eﬀe c to fu s i n gt h en e wm e a s u r eo nt h er e l a t i v el e v e lo f
indebtedness across countries and its implications for analyses of debt sustainability, and
examine how the new measure changes our understanding of the composition and evolution



















Figure 1: The Face Values of Sovereign Debt
4.A The Level of Indebtedness
Figure 1 plots the ratio of both contractual and ZCE face values of external sovereign
debt as a percent of Gross National Income (GNI), along with the ratio of the two series to
each other. By construction, contractual face values never exceed ZCE face values. Strikingly,
ZCE face values are much larger than contractual face values, always exceeding contractual
face values by at least 40% and sometimes by more than 50%. Whereas the contractual face
value of sovereign debt peaked in 1987 at about 42% of GNI, ZCE face values also peak in
1987 but at 62% of GNI.
Although both series produce a similar picture of the evolution of developing countries
indebtedness over the past 25 years, the relative size of contractual and ZCE face values has
changed substantially. ZCE face values exceeded contractual face values by more than 50
percent during the Latin American debt crisis of the late 1980s, which is the same time that
indebtedness levels reached their peak. The relative diﬀerence in levels declined substantially
to just over 40 percent in the early 1990s, reﬂecting the lower interest rates incorporated into
Brady bonds, before rising back to 45 percent by the turn of the millennium. Even though
overall indebtedness levels declined thereafter, the relative diﬀerence between the series did
11not change much.
As noted above, the quantitative theoretical literature on sovereign debt has focused
almost exclusively on zero-coupon bonds.7 When assessing the empirical performance of these
models, researchers have compared the level of indebtedness measured using the contractual
face values implied by the zero-coupon bonds that feature in the model, to the contractual face
values of the more complicated portfolio of debts observed in the data. These comparisons
have invariably yielded the conclusion that the benchmark model (with one period debt and
zero recovery rates in the event of a default) produces equilibrium levels of indebtedness
between 5 and 10 percentage points of GNI, which are dramatically below the levels of
indebtedness observed in the data for emerging market countries (as shown in Figure 2,
the ratio of the contractual face value of external sovereign debt to GDP for Latin American
countries have, until very recently, varied between 20% and 50%). This ﬁnding has motivated
a large literature to examine modiﬁcations of the benchmark model that deliver larger levels
of indebtedness.
The importance of this research agenda is further emphasized once it is understood
that theory and data have not been compared in a theoretically consistent way. If we compare
indebtedness using the theoretically consistent ZCE face values, the empirical performance of
the benchmark model of sovereign debt and default deteriorates further. For the same sample
of Latin American countries, the ratio of the ZCE face value of debt to GDP has tended to
be roughly 50 percent higher than the contractual face value measure, exceeding 80% at the
peak at the turn of the 1990s.
Other issues concerning the comparison of theory to data need to be addressed. Of
great importance is the fact that the models typically focus on one-period (which, given
the common quarterly calibration, amounts to a three-month maturity) debt whereas the
average maturity of debts in the data substantially exceed one year. One approach would be
to deﬁne the period length in the theory to be consistent with the average debt maturity in
the data. Another approach would further explore the use of longer maturity debt into these
models as initiated by Hatchondo and Martinez (2009), Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2010)
7See, for example, Arellano (2007), Aguiar and Gopinath (2005), Yue (2010), Tomz and Wright (2007),


















Figure 2: The Face Values of Sovereign Debt in Latin American countries.
and Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2009). As shown in the back-of-the-envelope calculations
in the Section 2 examples above, these long maturity debt models produce ZCE face value
indebtedness levels that are between 1.5 and 20 times as large as contractual face values,
bringing their predicted debt levels much closer to the levels measured in this paper.
4.B Relative Indebtedness and Indicators of Debt Sustainability
Moving from contractual to ZCE face values in the computation of debt stocks also
aﬀects the relative ranking of countries by indebtedness. One area in which this is important
is in the application of indicators of debt repayment diﬃculties. For example, until the mid-
1990s, the World Bank classiﬁed countries as “highly indebted” if, amongst other indicators,
the countries external debt (measured at contractual face values) to GDP ratio exceeded
50%. This designation has been used in assessing eligibility for debt relief. When debt stocks
are recomputed using ZCE face values, the measured debt stock increases for all countries
reducing the usefulness of the 50% threshold per se. More importantly, moving to ZCE face
values changes the rank ordering of countries.
Table 1 illustrates this issue by tabulating those countries that were in the neigh-
borhood of the 50% threshold in 1990 (when the threshold was used by the World Bank
131990 Debt Face Value/GNI (%)
Contractual ZCE
Countries Designated “Highly Indebted”
Comoros 55.3 66.1
Egypt 56.0 74.8









Table 1: Relative Indebtedness Levels in 1990
in awarding the highly indebted designation) and for which the relative ranking is reversed
when examined using ZCE face values. The most dramatic change concerns Mexico where
the contractual face value of debt only just exceeded the 30% threshold of a “moderately
indebted” country in 1990, but whose ZCE face value of 67.2% exceeds the ZCE face values
of four countries designated as highly indebted.8 A similarly large adjustment occurs for
Argentina which, like Mexico, borrows at high market interest rates.
The World Bank has since moved away from the use of contractual face values towards
present discounted values of debt service in designating countries as “highly indebted”. This
was motivated by the issue, discussed above, that contractual face values are misleading
indicators of relative indebtedness when some countries have access to concessional ﬁnancing
(see Claessens et al., 1996 and Easterly, 2001). However, the absence of widely available
data on the present value of domestic sovereign debt, or on the subcomponents of external
sovereign debt, has meant that researchers have continued to focus on thresholds deﬁned
in terms of contractual face values. For example, Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2010) study the
relationship between economic growth and indebtedness and ﬁnd that when external debt
exceeds 60% of GDP, annual growth rates decline by about 2% per year. This ﬁnding has
8Besides Comoros, the other three countries that would be considered highly indebted based on the con-
tractual value of the debt in percent of GNI and would have a ZCE debt below Mexico’s are Ghana, Niger
and Uganda.
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Sierra Leone 70.0 79.3
Countries Designated Below Threshold
Panama 48.5 105.4
Uruguay 44.7 90.7
Table 2: Relative Indebtedness Levels in 2006
since become the starting point for a number of other studies of the relationship between
indebtedness and economic growth (see Irons and Bivens, 2010 and Kumar and Woo, 2010).
Table 2 shows how the ordering of countries in the neighborhood of the 60% threshold
varies when indebtedness is measured using ZCE face values for the last year of our data. The
Table identiﬁes two countries whose contractual face values leave them under the threshold,
but whose ZCE face values place them in line with other countries that were previously above
the threshold.
4.C The Evolving Composition of External Sovereign Debt
The extent to which estimates of indebtedness calculated using contractual face values
diﬀer from those calculated using ZCE face values depends on the evolving mix of borrowing
instruments used in international debt markets debt instrument, as well as changes in world
interest rates, and changing circumstances of a country which is reﬂected in varying country
risk. As a consequence, measurements using ZCE face values paint a quantitatively, and in
some cases also qualitatively, diﬀe r e n tp i c t u r eo ft h ee v o l v i n gc o m p o s i t i o no ft h em a r k e tf o r
sovereign debt. In this subsection we explore those diﬀerences focusing on the changing per-
formance of diﬀerent debt instruments, diﬀerent regions, diﬀerent income groups of countries,
and the currencies in which countries borrow.
Debt Instruments
Figure 3 plots the ratio of ZCE to contractual face values for aggregates of ﬁve borrow-


















Figure 3: Ratio of ZCE to Nominal Face Values by Instrument
over time for both oﬃcial lending categories as well as the other private category (which
includes, amongst other things, long-term trade credit). Commercial banks loans have also
declined over time, although there were large increases in the late 1980s, and also during
the late 1990s and early 2000s, reﬂecting the changes in interest rates on commercial bank
loans. The largest changes are due to commercial bond lending, where the ratio jumped from
just over 1.4 in 1986 to over 2.2 in 1990, before stabilizing at roughly 1.8 thereafter. Set
against the example above, this is initially surprising since bonds issued at a discount should,
everything else equal, have higher ZCE to contractual face value ratios than equivalent loan
contracts issued at par. However, this eﬀe c ti sd o m i n a t e db yt h ef a c tt h a tt h ei n c r e a s ei n
bond lending was driven by bonds issued by riskier middle income countries facing market
interest rates.
The high average interest rates on private lending to sovereign countries implies that
moving from contractual to ZCE face values increases the relative importance of private sector
lenders in the outstanding stock of sovereign debt. As show in Table 3, while private sector
lending to sovereign countries had fallen to 42.4% by 2000 as measured using contractual
16Contractual ZCE
1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
Oﬃcial Lending 43.9 57.9 57.6 39.7 51.2 50.4
(i) Bilateral 30.4 33.9 29.6 26.9 29.4 26.1
(ii) Multilateral 13.5 24.0 28.0 12.8 21.7 24.3
Private Lending 56.1 42.1 42.4 60.3 48.8 49.6
(i) Commercial Banks 36.8 20.6 11.8 42.5 23.6 12.7
(ii) Bonds 4.3 11.1 26.1 4.1 16.3 32.9
(iii) Other 15.0 10.4 4.5 13.8 9.0 4.0
Table 3: Instrument Shares of Total Debt
face values, private sector lending still accounted for 49.6% of lending when measured using
ZCE face values. This was driven almost entirely by the growth in sovereign bond lending,
whose total share of lending increases by 6.8 percentage points in 2000 when moving from
contractual to ZCE face values.
Regions
Moving from contractual to ZCE face values also changes the composition of sovereign
debt across regions. As shown in Figure 4, Latin America and the Caribbean experiences the
largest increase in debt with the ratio of ZCE to contractual face values always above 50%
and even reaching 85% at the beginning of the 1990s. This reﬂects the greater dependence on
credit provided by private sector lenders at higher interest rates to countries in this region.
The ratio of ZCE to contractual face values is typically low for Sub-Saharan Africa reﬂecting
their tendency to borrow from oﬃcial creditors, often at concessional rates.
The diﬀerences in the instrument structure of sovereign debt across regions results in
a misstatement of the relative indebtedness of regions. Table 4 presents the share of total
outstanding debt owed by each of the World Bank’s six regional groupings of developing coun-
tries. Adjusting for these measurement issues, Latin America now accounts for an additional
5.2% of total developing country debt, while all other regions are reduced.
Income Levels
Similar patterns appear when we consider income levels. When ZCE and contractual
face values are compared, the diﬀerence is smallest for the high and low income countries.
This is because both of these groups of countries are able to borrow at the lowest interest






















Figure 4: Ratio of ZCE to Nominal Face Values by Region
Contractual ZCE
1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
Latin America & Caribbean 43.4 33.5 36.7 46.5 40.5 41.9
South Asia 10.6 13.5 11.8 8.9 11.4 11.0
East Asia & Paciﬁc 10.5 17.3 22.3 10.3 16.3 20.4
Europe & Central Asia 8.6 10.7 8.7 9.0 10.1 8.4
Middle East & North Africa 14.9 11.7 7.9 14.6 10.3 6.9
Sub-Saharan Africa 12.1 13.3 12.7 10.7 11.4 11.5
Table 4: Regional Shares of Total Debt
18Contractual ZCE
1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
High Income 2.6 2.6 1.7 2.7 2.3 1.5
Upper Middle Income 53.6 43.5 44.9 56.3 49.9 49.6
Lower Middle Income 36.2 45.4 45.9 34.3 40.8 42.9
Low Income 7.8 8.5 7.4 6.6 7.0 6.0













Figure 5: Number of Currencies Over Time
income countries because they are eligible for concessional loans from oﬃcial lenders. The
ratio increased for middle income countries with the largest diﬀerences, often in excess of
60%, being recorded for the upper middle income countries. As shown in Table 5, moving
from contractual to ZCE face values increases the share of upper middle income countries in
total developing country debt by, on average, roughly 5 percentage points.
Currency
Between 1979 and 2006, the total number of currencies in which outstanding external
sovereign debt is denominated varied between a maximum of 75 (in 1984) and a minimum of
54 (in 2003), as shown in Figure 5. This variation is in part explained by the large reduction
of the number of currencies used in trade credit, and other (non-bank and non-bond) forms
of debt owed to private creditors. These types of loans correspond to the type of instrument















Figure 6: Number of Currencies by Type of Instrument
of currencies assuming the euro had existed throughout the period.9 The ﬁrst thing to note
from the comparison of the two lines in Figure 5 is that the diﬀerence between the two is
relatively stable as it varies between 10 and 12 currencies.10 The second result to note regards
the fact that after 1999, which corresponds to the oﬃcial introduction of the Euro, there is
no visible change in the downward trend in the number of currencies used.11 This reﬂects the
fact that a number of long maturity debt contracts issued originally in the home currency of
a Euro-area member remained outstanding.
Even though the total number of currencies used is relatively large, borrowing is highly
concentrated in a few currencies. To give a better idea of how concentrated borrowing is,
in terms of the currency of choices, in Table 6 we show the 5 most important currencies at
diﬀerent points in time and also the share in total borrowing that these currencies represent.
9For this purposed we assumed the constituents of the euro in 2006: Austrian Schilling, Belgian Franc,
Netherlands Guilder, Finnish Markkaa, French Francs, German Mark, Irish Pound, Italian Lire, Luxembourg
Franc, Portuguese Escudo, Greek Drachma and Spanish Peseta.
10The two currencies that are not present the entire period are the Greek Drachma and the Irish Pound.
11The Euro was oﬃcially introduced in January 1, 1999, but the cash changeover only took place in January
1, 2002.
20Contractual Face Values ZCE Face Values
1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
1 U S D-6 5 . 4 U S D-5 7 . 2 U S D-6 2 . 5 USD - 68.9 USD - 62.4 USD - 68.5
2 DM - 7.9 YEN - 12.4 YEN - 13.4 YEN - 7.2 YEN - 11.0 YEN - 11.0
3 YEN - 7.9 DM - 8.7 SDR - 7.7 DM - 7.2 DM - 8.0 SDR - 5.8
4 FF - 5.4 SDR - 5.3 DM - 4.3 F F-5 . 2 F F-4 . 9 E U R O-4 . 0
5 GBP - 2.1 FF - 5.3 EURO - 4.2 CHF - 1.8 SDR - 3.9 DM - 3.8
Sum 88.7 88.9 91.9 90.3 90.3 93.1
2006 16.3 17.1 12.3 15.0 15.7 11.2
Table 6: Shares of Total Debt by Currency
In order to see how the importance of the Euro (or its constituents) evolves over time we
also show the relative importance of the debt denominated in the home currencies of Euro-
area members. Table 6 presents various results with respect to the most relevant currencies
in external sovereign debt stocks. First, the U.S. Dollar is the most important currency in
terms of external sovereign debt. Because bonds and commercial banks loans are normally
denominated in U.S. Dollars, and we already know that these instruments tend to have higher
interest rates, it is not surprising that the importance of the US Dollar increases when debt
stocks are measured at ZCE face values. Second, the Japanese Yen and the IMF Special
Drawing Rights (SDR) were the two currencies that gained the most importance during this
p e r i o d .I np a r t i c u l a r ,i n1 9 8 0t h eS D Rd i dn o te v e nm a k et h el i s to ft h e5m o s ti m p o r t a n t
currencies, but in years 1990 and 2000 it became the ﬁfth and the third most important
currency, respectively, when calculated based on ZCE face values. Similarly, the Yen in 1980
was slightly less important than the Deutsche Mark, but in 1990 and 2000 the share of the
Yen in comparison to the Deutsche Mark was 3 and 4.7 percentage points higher, respectively.
Third, throughout the sample period, and despite some changes in the relative importance of
each currency, 90% of total debt stocks are concentrated in ﬁve currencies. Finally, for both
contractual and ZCE face values, the importance of the Euro equivalent declined substantially
between 1990 and 2000, however, from our data it is not possible to tell why the introduction
of the Euro reduced the importance of the currencies that it replaces.
To conclude this part of the paper we show how currency composition varies across
regions and income levels. Table 7 shows the share of debt for diﬀerent currencies measured
in ZCE face values by region and by income level in the year 2000. In this Table it is shown
21Euro2006 Yen Pound SDR USD Other
Region
East Asia & Paciﬁc 4.9 25.0 0.6 4.2 64.5 0.7
Europe & Central Asia 22.1 10.3 0.5 4.3 61.3 1.6
Latin America & Caribbean 9.2 5.0 0.5 0.7 83.6 0.9
Middle East & North Africa 24.9 13.0 0.1 1.3 46.4 14.3
South Asia 5.1 12.9 0.4 18.2 62.2 1.1
Sub-Saharan Africa 19.3 5.7 0.7 18.9 45.2 10.2
Income Level
Low 7.1 9.4 1.3 41.8 27.4 12.9
Lower-Middle 10.5 16.4 0.4 6.6 62.8 3.2
Upper-Middle 11.7 6.3 0.5 0.9 79.2 1.4
High 30.6 20.3 1.4 0.2 43.6 3.9
Overall 11.2 11.0 0.5 5.8 68.5 2.9
Table 7: Currency Composition by Region and Income Level
that currency concentration varies both with the region and with the level of income. First,
even though the US Dollar is the most important currency, the level of importance can vary
signiﬁcantly. For example, in the year 2000, 83.6% of the external debt stock in Latin America
and the Caribbean is denominated in US Dollars, while, for the same year, in Sub-Saharan
Africa only 45.2% of external debt is denominated in US Dollars. Second, there appears
to be some evidence that the external debt stock currency also depends on proximity. In
East Asia and Paciﬁc, the share of debt denominated in Euro and Yen is, respectively, 4.9%
and 25.0%, while in Europe and Central Asia these ﬁgures are 22.1% and 10.3%. A similar
explanation may apply to the share of US Dollars in the total debt stock of Latin America and
the Caribbean. In terms of the currency denomination by income level, there are also some
interesting patterns. First, the importance of the US Dollar is only veriﬁed for the lower-
and upper-middle income countries. In the case of low income countries the most important
currency is Special Drawing Rights (41.8%) and in the case of high income countries the
diﬀerence between the ﬁrst and the second most important currencies (US Dollar and Euro,
respectively) is much smaller than in the cases of lower- and upper-middle income countries.
225 The Policy Implications of Measuring Indebtedness at Contrac-
tual Face Value
In this section we point to two areas where the focus on contractual face values gives
market participants an incentive to vary the contractual terms of debt issuance and where
this may aﬀect the outcomes of changes in international economic policy. We begin with a
discussion of the role of face values in determining voting rights in the event of a sovereign debt
restructuring and how this may interact with recent proposals for expanded use of collection
action and aggregation clauses in sovereign debt contracts. We then turn to a discussion of
the ways in which debtors vary their debt issuance when confronted with ﬁscal rules that are
written in terms of contractual face values or otherwise treat future interest and principal
payments in asymmetric ways.
5.A Face Values and Sovereign Debt Restructuring Negotiations
Another issue for which the distinction between principal and interest can be important
relates to the process by which sovereign debts are restructured. Since 2003, sovereign bonds
issued under New York law have included collective action clauses which specify the conditions
under which the terms of the bond may be changed. As one example of such a clause, Brazil’s
10.25% Global BRL Bonds due in 202812 speciﬁes that “the holders of not less than 85% (in
the case of Collective Action Securities designated “Type A” or having no designation as to
“Type”) or 75% (in the case of Collective Action Securities designated “Type B”) in aggregate
principal amount of the outstanding debt securities of that series, voting at a meeting or by
written consent, must consent to any amendment, modiﬁcation, change or waiver with respect
to”[emphasis added], amongst other things, repayment terms. That is, voting rights in the
event of a restructuring are allocated in proportion to a debt’s contractual face value
If all debts covered by a collective action clause divide repayments into principal and
interest in the same way, then voting in proportion to principal holdings will produce the
same outcomes as voting in proportion to a creditors overall exposure. When debt contracts
divide future cash-ﬂows in diﬀerent ways either explicitly, or implicitly due to non-stationary
repayment terms and diﬀerent maturities, this will not be the case. In particular, the holders
12http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/205317/000119312510234571/d424b5.htm
23of debts issued with higher coupons will have less voting rights than holders of equivalent
debts with lower coupons.
This issue is of practical importance today, and is likely to increase in importance over
time as aggregation clauses — clauses that group together diﬀerent debt securities in the even
of a renegotiation of sovereign debt — become more widespread. Uruguay has already issued
bonds containing aggregation clauses13 w h i l eo t h e rc o u n t r i e sp l a nt od os oi nt h ef u t u r e .
In Europe, for example, the Eurogroup statement of November 28, 2010 (Eurogroup 2010)
commits its members to introduce, starting in 2013, “aggregation clauses allowing all debt
securities issued by a Member State to be considered together in negotiations” [emphasis
added]. Proposals to introduce similar aggregation clauses in non-Euro-area sovereign bonds
have also been discussed in policy circles (IMF, 2002). Interpreting this policy broadly,
future debt restructuring negotiations would then involve negotiations across a very diverse
set of debt instruments including potentially debts issued by both oﬃcial and private sector
creditors, banks and bondholders, issued at diﬀerent maturities and in diﬀerent currencies
under diﬀerent governing laws. As a result of this diversity, shares of outstanding principal are
unlikely to be representative of the relative ﬁnancial exposure of diﬀerent creditors. Moreover,
it is conceivable that a desire to maximize voting power in the event of a restructuring might
inﬂuence the form of debt instrument desired by creditors.
To obtain a sense of the practical signiﬁcance of this issue, suppose that all debt secu-
rities were modiﬁed to contain aggregation clauses and that otherwise the contractual form of
a country’s debts remains the same as their level in 2006. If we restrict attention to sovereign
debt owed to private creditors, one potential source of conﬂict lies in the competing interests
of banks and bondholders. Table 8 collects the countries for which, in 2006, voting in pro-
portion to contractual face value would have yielded diﬀerent results than in a restructuring
where voting was in proportion to zero-coupon equivalent face value. With a simple majority
voting threshold, the bondholders of Mexico would hold a minority share calculated in terms
13Uruguay’s May 2003 issue of 10.50% Bonds due 2006 contained a clause allowing it to mod-
ify the reserved matters of two or more securities if “the holders of not less than 85% in
aggregate principal amount of the outstanding debt securities of all series that would be af-
fected by that modiﬁcation (taken in aggregate), and ... 66-2/3% in aggregate principal










Table 8: Bonds vs Other Private Creditors in 2006
of contractual face value despite being more exposed in the sense of holding a majority of the
ZCE face value stock of debt. With a 75% threshold, bondholders would possess the relevant
super-majority by moving to ZCE face value voting in the cases of Chile and Seychelles.
Somewhat surprisingly, a move to ZCE face value voting would lead bondholders to lose their
m a j o r i t yi nt h ec a s eo fB a r b a d o s .
In theory the de jure seniority of multilateral loans limits the potential for conﬂict be-
tween private sector creditors and multilateral oﬃcial creditors in debt restructuring negoti-
ations. In practice, the renegotiation of bilateral oﬃcial creditor loans is typically predicated
on private sector creditors receiving equal treatment. Interpreted literally, the Eurogroup
statement may be taken to mean that oﬃcial creditors will be subject to the same aggre-
gation clauses as private sector creditors in future debt restructuring negotiations. We next
examine the potential for conﬂict between private sector creditors (who are presumably mo-
tivated solely by a concern for proﬁts) and oﬃcial creditors (who may also be motivated by
concerns for equity).
Of the 100 countries in our balanced sample, oﬃcial creditors possess a simple majority
by contractual face values in 80 cases, and possess a 75% super-majority in 66 cases. Table 9
collects those cases in which a move from contractual to ZCE face value voting would aﬀect
t h ea b i l i t yo ft h eo ﬃcial sector to obtain a super-majority, or alternatively prevent the private
sector from obtaining a super-majority. In all eleven cases in the Table, a move to ZCE face
value voting would lead to the oﬃcial sector either losing its super-majority, or losing its
ability to prevent private sector creditors from reaching a super-majority.











St. Lucia 68.0 65.5
50% Threshold
Ecuador 57.8 43.6
El Salvador 58.3 41.1
Philippines 50.7 40.6
St. Vincent & Gr. 50.8 49.9
Table 9: Oﬃcial vs Private Creditors in 2006
gregation clauses with voting based on contractual face values would lead to the eﬀective
subordination of private sector claims. This may, in turn, partly explain the reluctance of
private sector creditors to participate in bond issues with aggregation clauses and their favor
with policy makers. However, these calculations also suggest that, should the oﬃcial sector
succeed in encouraging widespread adoption of broadly deﬁned aggregation clauses, private
sector creditors will have an incentive to adopt contractual forms (such as zero-coupon bonds)
that maximize the contractual face value of their claim and so maximize their voting power
in the event of a restructuring. And in at least eleven cases, this would result in the eﬀective
subordination of oﬃcial sector claims.
5.B Manipulation of Fiscal Statistics
There is often an incentive for the government of a country to present data on debt
stocks, and ﬁscal deﬁcits, in a favorable light. Sometimes this incentive is the result of speciﬁc
accounting rules, such as the debt stock limits of the USA and Denmark, the budget deﬁcit
and debt stock restrictions imposed by the Maastricht Treaty on EU countries, or ﬁscal targets
imposed by IMF lending arrangements. In other cases, the incentive arises implicitly from
the desire to improve domestic political performance or the terms on which external debts
26can be issued. The most common form of manipulation involves using proceeds from the
sale of assets, ranging from privatization to the development of currency swaps, as used by
Greece, to substitute for debt issuance. In addition, when the relevant statistics that are being
targeted treat principal and interest asymmetrically, governments have also manipulated the
contractual forms of new debt issuance to meet speciﬁc targets and disguise an underlying
d e t e r i o r a t i o ni nt h ec o u n t r y ’ sﬁscal position (see the discussion in Easterly 1999, Piga 2001,
Milesi-Ferretti 2004, and Koen and van den Noord 2005).
The asymmetric treatment of interest and principal in ﬁscal targets is common. For
example, the US debt ceiling, which has been the subject of much recent debate, applies
to the contractual face value of US sovereign debt, with the relevant law stating that “The
face amount of obligations issued under this chapter [31 USCS §§ 3101 et seq.] and the
face amount of obligations whose principal and interest are guaranteed by the United States
Government (except guaranteed obligations held by the Secretary of the Treasury) may not
be more than $ 14,294,000,000,000 outstanding at one time” (31 U.S.C. 3101(b)). Likewise,
the Excessive Deﬁcits Procedure of the Maastricht Treaty speciﬁes a debt threshold of 60%
of GDP where “‘debt’ means total gross debt at nominal value outstanding at the end of
the year and consolidated between and within the sectors of general government” (Article
2.d) and where “the nominal value is considered equivalent to the face value of liabilities”
(Eurostat 2010 p.305).
In the early years of the Maastricht Treaty, changes in the relative issuance of low-face-
value-high-coupon and high-face-value-low-coupon debt by EU governments to understate
either debt stocks or ﬁscal deﬁcits appears to have been common. Koen and van der Noord
(2005) document more than twenty cases in which the treatment of interest payments in the
ﬁscal accounts by EU countries was questionable. Perhaps the best known example of these
comes from Italy, which reduced the contractual face value of the stock of government debt by
1.9 percentage points of GDP in 2002 when Italy was close to the Maastricht debt threshold.
In this example, the Italian Treasury with the Banca d’Italia bought back long-term bonds
with a low coupon in exchange for a smaller amount of bonds with a much higher coupon.
The use of ZCE face values would eliminate this incentive and, indeed, in response to these
concerns about the manipulation of debt and budget statistics, Eurostat introduced new rules
27in 1997 requiring the imputation of interest payments on zero coupon debts and other deeply
discounted bonds so that measured principal and interest payments for these classes of debt
contracts would be treated symmetrically with debts issues at par (Eurostat 1997a, b).
Another example of the asymmetric treatment of interest and principal in ﬁscal targets
comes from IMF Stand-By Arrangements with Argentina throughout the 1990s.14 In the 1991
Stand-By Arrangement, the performance criteria targeted the overall cash balance of the
government (which included interest payments) as well as the stock of outstanding disbursed
external debt (IMF, 2001). By contrast, in the 1996 Stand-By Arrangement, the performance
criteria targeted ﬁscal expenditures excluding interest payments on debt (IMF, 1996; see also
IMF IEO, 2004). As a consequence, starting in 1996 Argentina had an incentive to switch
to issuing low-face-value high-coupon debt in order to meet the IMF targets for non-interest
expenditures.
Our database shows that Argentina responded to this incentive. Figures 7 and 8 plot
the ratio of the undiscounted sum of future interest payments to the contractual face value
of outstanding debt by instrument for both Deutsche Mark and U.S. Dollars denominated
Argentine external sovereign debt. Both Figures show that, starting in 1996, the ratio of
future interest payments to contractual face values for sovereign bonds jumps dramatically.
Moreover, this pattern is not repeated for any other class of debt instrument, suggesting that
it does not reﬂect some other change in the environment aﬀecting Argentine borrowing.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Data on the stock of sovereign debt is typically presented at contractual face value. De-
ﬁned as the sum of future principal repayments, contractual face values can paint a misleading
picture of indebtedness because they treat debts with identical total cashﬂows diﬀerently if
they have diﬀerent contractual forms (that is, if the debts divide these cashﬂows into prin-
cipal and interest in diﬀerent ways). In this paper, we introduced a measure of the stock of
sovereign debt that is invariant to contractual form — the zero coupon equivalent face value —
14Other cases no doubt exist. Easterly (1999, 2001) states that Brazil issued zero coupon debt in 1998 so
as to understate current interest expenditures. However, we have been unable to uncover any other sources













Figure 7: Ratio of the sum of interest to the sum of principal payments by instrument in















Figure 8: Ratio of the sum of interest to the sum of principal payments by instrument in U.S.
Dollars for Argentina.
29and applied it to data on the external sovereign debt of 100 developing countries from 1979
to 2006.
We found that using a measure that is invariant to contractual form paints a very
diﬀerent quantitative picture, and in some cases also a diﬀerent qualitative picture, of the
stock of developing country external sovereign debt. For example, according to our measure,
the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean are relatively more indebted than countries
in other regions because of their access to market sources of funding which charge higher
interest rates. The rankings of individual countries in terms of their indebtedness, which
historically was used as a criterion for eligibility for debt relief, can also change signiﬁcantly.
For example Mexico, which was classiﬁed as moderately indebted by the World Bank in 1990
based on the total stock of external sovereign debt at contractual face value, is more heavily
indebted than some countries that were classiﬁed as highly indebted, once indebtedness is
measured in a way that is invariant to contractual form.
Our zero-coupon equivalent face value measure is particularly useful for comparing
the data with the growing quantitative theoretical literature on sovereign debt that typically
assumes that all debts take the form of zero-coupon bonds. As is well known, models in this
literature produce zero-coupon face value debt levels that are almost an order of magnitude
smaller that the contractual face value debt stock data available. When our theoretically
consistent zero-coupon equivalent face value measure is used, the empirical performance of
these models is found to be on average between an additional 40 and 80 percent worse than
previously thought.
Finally, we pointed to the incentives for both creditors and debtors to manipulate
the contractual structure of debts in light of the emphasis on contractual face values. For
creditors, voting power during debt restructuring negotiations is in proportion to contractual
face value. As aggregation clauses — which combine diﬀerent debt instruments for the purpose
of one restructuring — in debt instruments become more widespread, creditors holding high
contractual face value debt will therefore possess a voting advantage. Using our data, we
establish that this has the potential to eﬀectively subordinate private sector bondholders.
Similarly, we show that debtors have an incentive to manipulate their debt statistics when
they are evaluated on measures that emphasize principal repayment (such as contractual face
30values), or that emphasize interest payments, and use our data to make a prima facie case
for manipulation by one country in our dataset.
The paper points to the desirability for further work in at least three directions. First,
in the light of a surge of recent interest, it would be desirable to construct a similar contract
invariant measure of domestic sovereign debt. Second, as emphasized above, our paper has
nothing to say about the desirability or appropriateness of diﬀerent methods for discounting
cash ﬂows to arrive at an appropriate valuation for the stock of external sovereign debt. In a
companion paper (Dias, Richmond and Wright 2011) we present a theoretical framework that
suggests that the appropriate discount rate will vary according to the purpose for which the
values will be used, as well as across countries and over time. We also present several methods
for implementing the implications of that theory. Third, and relatedly, our paper also has
little to say about the maturity structure of external sovereign debts, which has been a topic
of recent academic and policy interest. In future work we aim to use our data to construct a
comprehensive set of estimates of the maturity of external sovereign debts, disaggregated by
country, instrument, and currency of issue, which we will then use to discipline the existing
models of the maturity structure of external sovereign debt.
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7 Appendix A: Country List
In our calculations we used a sub-set of the total number of countries that are available
in the dataset. The reason was that we wanted to use a balanced panel in order to avoid
potential attrition problems. In the original dataset there are 138 countries, while in our
33Country Region Inc.Group Country Region Inc.Group
Algeria MENA UMI El Salvador LAC LMI
Argentina LAC UMI Equatorial Guinea SSA HI
Bangladesh SA LI Ethiopia SSA LI
Barbados LAC HI Fiji EAP UMI
Belize LAC LMI Gabon SSA UMI
Benin SSA LI Gambia, The SSA LI
Bolivia LAC LMI Ghana SSA LI
Botswana SSA UMI Grenada LAC UMI
Brazil LAC UMI Guatemala LAC LMI
Bulgaria ECA UMI Guinea SSA LI
Burkina Faso SSA LI Guinea-Bissau SSA LI
Burundi SSA LI Guyana LAC LMI
Cameroon SSA LMI Haiti LAC LI
Cape Verde SSA LMI Honduras LAC LMI
Central Afr. Republic SSA LI Hungary ECA HI
Chad SSA LI India SA LMI
Chile LAC UMI Indonesia EAP LMI
China EAP LMI Jamaica LAC UMI
Colombia LAC UMI Jordan MENA LMI
Comoros SSA LI Kenya SSA LI
Congo, Dem. Republic SSA LI Lesotho SSA LMI
Congo, Republic SSA LMI Liberia SSA LI
Costa Rica LAC UMI Madagascar SSA LI
Cote D’Ivoire SSA LMI Malawi SSA LI
Djibouti MENA LMI Malaysia EAP UMI
Dominica LAC UMI Maldives SA LMI
Dominican Republic LAC UMI Mali SSA LI
Ecuador LAC LMI Malta ECA HI
Egypt MENA LMI Mauritania SSA LI
work sample we use 100 countries. Table 10 contains this list of countries. In Appendix C
we show that our results are qualitatively identical when we use the full set of countries.
Note: The region and income level identiﬁers are deﬁned as follows. Region: EAP
= East Asia and Paciﬁc; ECA = Europe and Central Asia; LAC = Latin America and
Caribbean; MENA = Middle East and North Africa; SA = South Asia; SSA = Sub-Saharan
Africa. Income: LI = Low Income; LMI = Lower Middle Income; UMI = Upper Middle
Income; HI = High Income.
34Country Region Inc.Group Country Region Inc.Group
Mauritius SSA UMI Sierra Leone SSA LI
Mexico LAC UMI Solomon Islands EAP LMI
Morocco MENA LMI Sri Lanka SA LMI
Mozambique SSA LI St. Kittis and Nevis LAC UMI
Nepal SA LI St. Lucia LAC UMI
Nicaragua LAC LMI St. Vicent and Gre. LAC UMI
Niger SSA LI Sudan SSA LMI
Nigeria SSA LMI Swaziland SSA LMI
Oman MENA HI Syria MENA LMI
Pakistan SA LMI Tanzania SSA LI
Panama LAC UMI Thailand EAP LMI
Papua New Guinea EAP LMI Togo SSA LI
Paraguay LAC LMI Tonga EAP LMI
Peru LAC UMI Trinidad and Tobago LAC HI
Philippines EAP LMI Tunisia MENA LMI
Poland ECA UMI Turkey ECA UMI
Rwanda SSA LI Uganda SSA LI
Samoa EAP LMI Uruguay LAC UMI
Sao Tome & Principe SSA LMI Vanuatu EAP LMI
Senegal SSA LI Venezuela LAC UMI
Seychelles SSA UMI Zambia SSA LI
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Figure 9: Comparing publicly available data with our data - aggregate values. Units: % GNI.
8 Appendix B: Comparison To World Bank Published Data
As argued above, our data when aggregated, almost replicates the publicly available
data that is published by the World Bank. In this appendix our goal is to provide evidence
supporting this claim.
In Figure 9 we compare some of our data with the data that is publicly available in
the World Bank Global Development Financial indicators dataset. As it is visible in Figure
9t h ed i ﬀerences between the two series are very small which shows that, at least at the
aggregate level, our data is very similar to the data that is publicly available. Our data tends
to systematically produce higher values for the debt stocks than those based on publicly
available data, but the correlation between the two series is 99.2%. This comparison is only
done for those countries that we used in our analyses and for which there is publicly available
data.
Because in the paper we focus many of our analyses on the composition of debt in
terms of instrument and also on the geographical distribution of debt stocks we also provide
some comparisons between our data and the data that is publicly available. Tables 11 and 12
36Publicly available data Sum of Principal
1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
Oﬃcial Lending 881 6 31 1 69 71 9 21 3 4
(i) Bilateral Loans 609 76 16 61 1 37 1
(ii) Multilateral Loans 286 65 53 17 96 3
Private Lending 841 1 48 28 91 0 38 6
(i) Commercial Banks 757 72 27 96 62 6
(ii) Bonds 093 76 01 03 76 0
Table 11: Comparison Between Reported and Constructed Contractual Face Values by Debt
Instrument (as % GNI)
Publicly available data Sum of Principal
1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
L a t i nA m e r i c aa n dC a r i b b e a n 1853 1 02 0 01 9 92 8 52 1 6
East Asia and Paciﬁc 1802 2 41 5 31 7 92 3 91 5 5
Europe and Central Asia 2273 8 82 4 32 2 63 6 62 5 7
South Asia 1342 6 62 2 31 4 63 0 12 2 4
North Africa and Middle East 4776 4 53 7 44 7 86 1 23 8 1
Sub-Saharan Africa 2758 6 98 0 82 6 98 1 99 0 2
Table 12: Comparison Between Reported and Constructed Contractual Face Values by Region
(as % GNI)
show that there are some diﬀerences between our data and the data that is publicly available,
but, these diﬀerences do not compromise our main results.
There are a number of reasons why the published data on contractual face values,
which are based on direct reports of contractual face values by the country, might diﬀer from
our construction of face values by summing principal ﬂows. The ﬁr s ti st h a tt h ec o u n t r y
itself may have inadvertently reported contractual face values that diﬀer form the sum of
future principal speciﬁed in their loan agreements. The second concerns the way debt with
tranches issued in diﬀerent currencies are reported. In such cases, the Debtor Reporting
System Manual gives countries the option to combine the amounts from diﬀerent tranches
“at the exchange rates prevailing on the date of the commitment” (World Bank, 2000, p.
12). As future principal repayments are speciﬁed using current and forecast future exchange
rates, they can be expected to diﬀer from amounts calculated using exchange rates at time
of issue.
37Country # Years Country # Years
Afghanistan 28 Lithuania 17
Albania 18 Macedonia 28
Angola 28 Moldova 16
Armenia 16 Mongolia 22
Azerbaijan 14 Montenegro 7
Belarus 15 Myanmar 28
Bhutan 27 Romania 28
Bosnia-Herzegovina 28 Russian Federation 28
Cambodia 28 Serbia 28
Croatia 20 Slovak Republic 28
Eritrea 14 Somalia 28
Estonia 15 South Africa 17
Georgia 15 Tajikistan 15
Iran 28 Turkmenistan 15
Kazakhstan 15 Ukraine 15
Kyrgyz Republic 15 Uzbekistan 15
Laos 28 Vietnam 28
Latvia 16 Yemen 28
Lebanon 28 Zimbabwe 28
Table 13: List of countries in our dataset that were excluded from the analysis.
9 Appendix C: Results From Unbalanced Sample
In the data we obtained from the World Bank there were a total of 138 countries but
we only used a subset of 100 countries in our calculations. The main reason for this diﬀerence
i st h ef a c tt h a tw ew a n t e dt oh a v eab a l a n c e ds a m p l eo fc o u n t r i e sa n da v o i dn o i s ei no u r
results that is caused by changes in the composition of the sample. There are two reasons
that motivated the exclusion of 38 countries: 1) for 17 countries, the data we obtained from
the World Bank contains information for the entire sample period (1979-2006), but, we were
not able to ﬁnd reliable estimates of Gross National Income (GNI) for these countries over
the whole sample period; 2) for the remaining 21 countries, the data on debt did not cover
the entire sample period and for the reasons discussed above we decided to exclude them
from the analysis. This last group of countries is mostly composed of former Soviet Union
countries and other Eastern European countries - there are some exceptions. Below, we list
the countries for which we have data but did not use in our analysis.
















Figure 10: Comparison between samples: included vs. excluded countries
that certain results can be diﬀerent for the set of excluded countries in comparison to the
set of countries included in the analysis. To give an idea of how diﬀerent these two sets of
countries are we compare our proposed measure of debt stocks, zero coupon equivalent, with
the commonly used sum of principal. We choose this statistic for two reasons: ﬁrst for some
countries we do not have GNI data for the entire sample period and therefore cannot compare
t h ee n t i r es e to fc o u n t r i e sf o rt h ee n t i r es a m p l ep e r i o d ;a n ds e c o n d ,t h ed i ﬀerence between
ZCE and sum of principal is one the main points we make in the paper.
From Figure 10 it is visible that there are some diﬀerences between the three sets of
countries. In particular, countries that were excluded due to missing data tend to have a
substantially smaller diﬀerence between debt stocks based on ZCE and those based on the
sum of principal. This is in part due to the fact that Eastern European and former Soviet
Union countries were able to obtain loans at relatively low interest rates. In proportion to
the whole debt stock (all 138 countries), the debt stock of countries that were excluded due
to missing data never account for more than 4% of the entire debt stock. Regarding the set
countries that were excluded due to missing GNI data there are periods where there are no
signiﬁcant diﬀerences relative to the sample of countries that was used for analysis. But there
is a period, between 1989 and 1996 where the diﬀerences are relatively large. The reasons for
39these diﬀerences are not clear to us. Despite these diﬀerences, our main conclusions in the
paper are not aﬀected by the sample that we use and they simply reﬂect that there is some
heterogeneity with respect to some of the issues we raise.
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